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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

OTIS B. KIRK,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
Cross Appellee,
District Court No. 924901709
vs.

Court of Appeals No. 940067-CA

PEGGIE M. KIRK,
Priority Classification: 15
Defendant, Appellee,
Cross Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE
APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE (hereinafter "Mr. Kirk") submits the following as his
Reply Brief on the issues raised on his appeal and as his Response Brief on the issues raised by
the Cross Appellant herein:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Kirk stated in his prior Brief that the standard of review for all the issues he raised
on appeal was the abuse of discretion standard. The correct standard for the issues raised under
Section 1(B) of his prior Brief dealing with conclusions of law is the correction of error standard.
As noted in Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 1994):
While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce appeals are reviewed
under the "clearly erroneous standard," its conclusions of law "are reviewed for
correctness and given no special deference on appeal." (citations omitted)
(Emphasis added)

REPLY/RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS STATEMENT OF FACTS
Ms. Kirk's Statement of Facts includes a number of statements not contained in the record
where cited nor elsewhere in the record. Therefore, it is necessary for Mr. Kirk to reply to such
inaccuracies below:
Income and Marital History
Peggy Kirk
Health and Ability to Work Full-Time
Ms. Kirk states in her Brief on page 5:
In recent years she had tried to work 4 to 5 hours per day and when asked
by Mr. Kirk's counsel why she couldn't work 8 hours a day, she said at her
present age she simply didn't have the stamina to do so. (R-594)
The record at 594 provides as follows:

A.
Q.

What are your hours?
Flexible.
And by that, you can put [in] as many hours as you want?
Yes.
So how many hours do you work?
This - I haven't really put a lot in.
So tell the Court how many hours per week?
Oh, I would say maybe four - five.
So in 1992, the amount that you listed as your business income of
approximately $3,000 was part-time?
Yes.
Twenty hours per week?

A.

Roughly.

Q
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

The record there does not support that Ms. Kirk lacked the stamina to work full-time.
Nothing in the record indicates any illness or other health problems preventing Ms. Kirk from
working full-time for which work she has every opportunity to do.
Ms. Kirk's Savings Increased $2,588.51 While she Met All Her Expenses
She states in her Brief on page 6:
She had average and actual monthly living expenses of $2,287.00 leaving
a shortfall of $658.00 per month. (Ex D-25; R-530, 566) Since her separation
from Mr. Kirk, she had been using savings to meet that shortfall. (R-571)
The only evidence in the record that Ms. Kirk allegedly used her savings to cover
expenses is found where cited by Ms. Kirk at page 571. There, Mr. Kirk's counsel asks Ms.
Kirk a question designed to impeach her testimony: "So you've been using that checking account

to help pay your living expenses?" Ms. Kirk responded, "Yes". Nevertheless, her affirmative
response seriously contradicts her other very credible testimony as follows:
She states in her Brief on page 6 that prior to the marriage she "had a small savings
account of approximately $8,900.00, (Ex. D-31)." The foregoing sum and the supporting exhibit
reflect the amount she had in savings at the time of the divorce, not prior to the marriage. Her
Exhibit D-32 reflects her total savings prior to the marriage. That Exhibit shows a $6,206.77
ending balance. Both D-32 and D-31 were included in the Addendum to Mr. Kirk's prior Brief
as Exhibits "E" and "F". Thus the facts clearly show a substantial increase in her savings balance
during the pendency of the underlying proceedings. The facts clearly demonstrate that she used
none of her savings to meet her alleged shortfall. Her savings increased $2,588.51.
Ms. Kirk had no shortfall, let alone $685 per month. At no time did she claim to have
borrowed money to meet her expenses. She apparently met her monthly expense obligations
prior to trial. She did not claim she was in any way delinquent in such expenses at trial. In
addition, she had paid her counsel an average of $517 per month over the nine months prior to
trial. (D-34)
Thus, while her bank balance increased $2,588.51, her own testimony shows her having
$1,200 per month more than she claimed elsewhere.

Otis Kirk
Ms. Kirk states in her Brief on page 7:
After taxes and the payment of a $1,000.00 per month alimony award, Mr.
Kirk was left with $2,736.00 per month net from which to meet his day to day
living expenses. (Ex D-33, R-379)
The record, neither in D-33 nor at R-379, supports that Mr. Kirk "was left with $2,736.00
per month".
History of Relationship
Ms. Kirk states in her Brief on page 9:
During this courtship and in connection with the financial concerns Mrs.
Kirk had, particularly the loss of her alimony, the parties agreed that they would
pool their assets and share everything. (R-109, 283, 286, 386, 369, 370, 411, 600,
603, 604)
Most of the foregoing citations to the record do not support a "pooling" or "sharing" of
everything.
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R-109 is a page from Mr. Kirk's Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff s Motion for a New
Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment. The language at said page, while acknowledging "a mutual
discussion wherein each would pool his or her incomes" (emphasis added) nowhere supports a
pooling of assets nor a sharing of everything. The text at R-109 in fact states: "Finances were
discussed, but not on the pretext or reprseentation (sic) by the plaintiff that he would take care
of the defendant for the rest of her life."
At R-283 Mr. Kirk responds to his counsel's question regarding sharing income after
marriage. There Mr. Kirk states that "between what she was making, and what I was making,
I pointed out to her that we should be able to make a go of the marriage if we didn't overspend,
if we just watched what we were doing." Nothing there supports that "the parties agreed that
they would pool their assets and share everything" as contended by Ms. Kirk in her Brief.
At R-286 Mr. Kirk testifies that Ms. Kirk continued after their marriage to solely manage
her checking account wherein she deposited her income. He testifies that contrary to their
discussions before the marriage, that Ms. Kirk did not share her income with him after the
marriage . Nothing there supports a pooling of assets nor sharing of everything.
At R-386 Mr. Kirk testifies concerning some of his financial accounts. Nevertheless,
nothing there refers to a pooling or sharing of anything.
The rest of Ms. Kirk's references to the record support at best, some indication to share
share financially while married.
REPLY/RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I of Ms. Kirk's argument contends Mr. Kirk failed to marshall the required evidence
relating to alimony and attorney fees and demonstrate the insufficiency thereof. This Point
responds to Argument Section I and its subsections in Mr. Kirk's previous Brief. Mr. Kirk has
demonstrated the insufficiency of the evidence to support the alimony and attorney fee awards
and shown the findings thereon to be clearly erroneous. The findings are clearly erroneous in
view of the irrefutable evidence submitted on Ms. Kirk's own Trial Exhibits and testimony,
which prove the doubtful evidence relied on by the Trial Court to be impossible, and thus clearly
erroneous.

4

Point II of Ms. Kirk's argument contends the Trial Court made adequate Findings of Fact
relating to alimony and attorney fees. This Point likewise responds to Argument Section I and
its subsections in Mr. Kirk's previous Brief. The Trial Court's findings are inadequate or clearly
erroneous because of the following:
a)

They seriously contradict the prima facia and irrefutable evidence provided

by Ms. Kirk through her own Trial Exhibits concerning her need for alimony as well as her
ability to support herself;
b)

They are premised to a large degree on the invalid theories that 1) Mr. Kirk

is obligated to replace Ms. Kirk's prior alimony, lost by the parties' marriage, and 2) Mr. Kirk's
purported verbal promise to financially take care of Ms. Kirk for the loss of her prior alimony,
such a promise being unenforceable where contrary to the Statute of Frauds;
c)

They ignore that no marital standard of living was established by the parties

during the marriage upon which to base alimony; and
d)

They fail to adequately recognize the relevance of the parties' very brief

marriage of less than one year in making its alimony award.
Point III of Ms. Kirk's argument contends the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees was
properly considered and its findings were adequate to support the award. This Point responds
to Section II and its subsections of the Argument in Mr. Kirk's previous Brief. Again the
findings are clearly erroneous in that they contradict the irrefutable evidence contained in Ms.
Kirk's own Trial Exhibits and testimony, amply demonstrating Ms. Kirk's lack of need for
attorney fees and her own ability to pay for the same. Further, the findings, a) do not address
appropriate factors in considering the reasonableness of such fees, and b) rely on a mere proffer insufficient to support the appropriate factors on reasonableness.
Point IV of Ms. Kirk's argument commences her cross appeal on the division of assets
issue. The parties did not enter into any ante- or post-nuptial agreement. The Trust they created
following their marriage was drafted only as an estate planning device and only intended to
function as such. Awarding Ms. Kirk half of the property actually transferred into the Trust
would weigh heavily against public policy.
Point V of Ms. Kirk's argument continues her cross appeal contending that she should
have been awarded all her fees rather than only a major part thereof. Ms. Kirk is not entitled
to all such fees, just as she is not entitled to the fees awarded by the Trial Court. The evidence
5

provided by Ms. Kirk herself amply demonstrates her own ability to pay the $4,664.92 she paid
to her counsel prior to trial and no need for Mr. Kirk to reimburse her for the same.
Point VI of Ms. Kirk's argument concludes her cross appeal contending she is entitled to
all her attorney's fees and costs on appeal on the assumption she will prevail. Should Mr. Kirk
prevail on appeal, he is entitled to his attorney's fees and costs on appeal, given Ms. Kirk's
ability to pay for the same.
RESPONSE/REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
REPLY TO POINT I
THE $1000 PER MONTH ALIMONY AWARD IS CLEARLY UNJUST AND
A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE MS. KIRK'S OWN IRREFUTABLE
EVIDENCE SHOWS SHE HAS AVAILABLE $1,200 PER MONTH MORE THAN
SHE CLAIMED IN HER DOUBTFUL OTHER TESTIMONY, THUS MAKING THE
FINDINGS ON HER NEED AND ABILITY CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
While trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in determining alimony and attorney
fee awards, such courts cannot ignore irrefutable evidence, particularly when such evidence is
submitted by the party requesting alimony. Where such irrefutable evidence seriously contradicts
the evidence relied on, findings are clearly erroneous. The $1,000 per month permanent alimony
award is thus unjust and a clear abuse of discretion.
As noted by Ms. Kirk, Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah App. 1989) provides
as follows:
A finding is clearly erroneous when, even though there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Kirk acknowledges that to attack factual findings,
[a]n appellant must marshall the evidence in support of the findings and
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking
in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making them
"clearly erroneous." (Emphasis added)
(In re Estate ofBartell 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191,
193 (Utah 1987))
Mr. Kirk discussed the meager evidence which showed support of the Trial Court's
alimony award. That evidence consisted of Ms. Kirk's testimony and her supporting trial
Exhibits D-24 and D-25, which exhibits were included in Mr. Kirk's prior Brief under the
6

Addendum as Exhibits "G" and "H". In said Exhibits, Ms. Kirk sets forth her alleged monthly
expenses and her purported monthly income. She states her monthly expenses as being $2,287
and her income as being $1,690 - including receiving $1,000 monthly alimony.
The Trial Court accepted Ms. Kirk's testimony, despite no documentation supporting her
claimed expenses, and found:
38. . . . Defendant's total monthly income without the benefit of alimony
from plaintiff is only the sum of $690 a month. This income was set out in
defendant's Exhibit 24, which the Court accepts.
39.
The Court finds that defendant's reasonable monthly living expenses
are $2,287 as reflected in her Exhibit D-25, which the Court accepts and finds to
be reasonable....
The aforesaid findings are nevertheless clearly erroneous when Ms. Kirk's other testimony
and supporting exhibits are considered. Ms. Kirk did not list her attorney's fees nor costs as a
monthly expense in D-25. Yet she clearly admits to having paid $4,664.92 to her counsel under
Payments to Date in D-34. She had the ability to pay said sum, as shown in D-34 from 6/24/92
to 2/23/93 - a period of nine (9) months. She averaged paying $517.21 per month during those
nine months prior to trial.
Ms. Kirk appears to have a shortfall of $685 between her $2,287 in expenses and $1,602
net income after taxes. Ms. Kirk was not delinquent in any expense at trial time. She had not
borrowed any money to make up the purported shortfall. She claimed to have drawn from her
savings to meet the shortfall. (TV2:166 L3 to 167 L6) Nevertheless, her own exhibits belie this
claim as shown below. (See D-31 and D-32, included in the Addendum as Exhibits "E" and "F"
in Mr. Kirk's previous Brief.) Ms. Kirk's D-32 shows a beginning balance of $5,388.37. Her
D-31 shows at the time of trial, her accounts ended with balances of $4,215.24 and $3,761.64,
totaling $7,976.88. Thus, Ms. Kirk's savings increased by $2,588.51. She was obviously not
using her savings to meet her expenses. When confronted with the forgoing facts and asked to
account for her alleged $685 shortfall, she admitted: "These are the figures. I don't know."
(TV2:164 L5-6) The actual increase in her savings shows her ability, while receiving $1,000
monthly alimony, to meet all her claimed expenses and pay an average of $517 per month to her
counsel, and still have excess funds to deposit in her savings.
Obviously she both met her purported $685 per month shortfall and paid $517 average
per month to her counsel. It is irrefutable that she has over $1,200 per month not considered by
the Trial Court. To have ignored this $1,200 per month makes the findings supporting the $1,000
7

monthly alimony award clearly erroneous.
Ms. Kirk's $1,200 extra per month relies on her own testimony and exhibits. There is
no reason to discount those exhibits and her testimony over her purported expense and income
Exhibits D-24 and 25. Her showing the ability to pay $517 per month to her counsel (D-31) and
meet all her expenses without borrowing funds or drawing on her savings, is no less credible
evidence. To the contrary, it is more credible for the following reasons:
It is irrefutable that Ms. Kirk averaged paying her counsel $517 per month during the nine
(9) months prior to trial. It is also irrefutable that she had no $685 shortfall. Further, it is
irrefutable that her savings increased $2,588.51. Ms. Kirk provided no documentation in support
of her alleged expenses as required by Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993). Ms.
Kirk did not refute the foregoing evidence. Because of the foregoing irrefutable evidence, Ms.
Kirk's claimed income and expenses is impossible. They cannot be accurate in the face of her
credible certain evidence.
No correct conclusion can be made other than the following: Ms. Kirk's actual income
is $1,200 higher than she claimed, her actual expenses are $1,200 less than she claimed, or likely
a combination of both.
Considering the $1,200 extra per month, Ms. Kirk has no need for any part of $1,000 in
monthly alimony. The weight of this evidence provided and unrefuted by Ms. Kirk herself,
makes the alimony award clearly erroneous. Thus the alimony award should be vacated in its
entirety by this Court. Alternatively, the award should be reversed and remanded to consider
Ms. Kirk's additional $1200 per month in assessing alimony.
REPLY TO POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SEVERAL ERRORS IN
CONNECTION WITH ITS ALIMONY AWARD AND ITS
ENTRY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THEREON.
Ms. Kirk made little response to Mr. Kirk's argument under Point I (B) and (D) of his
previous Brief other than to comment it "is certainly educational". Ms. Kirk ignores that the
Trial Court's major premise for its alimony award is legally flawed. The Trial Court erroneously
concluded that Mr. Kirk was obligated to replace Ms. Kirk's lost alimony, particularly concluding
in error that Mr. Kirk's purported promise is enforceable, and thereby excluding the relevancy
on the shortness of the one year marriage.
After quoting the alimony findings in their entirety, Ms. Kirk extrapolates tidbits thereof
8

and sets forth a summary supporting her view. Her summary ignores the invalid replacement and
promise theories running continuously throughout the alimony findings as supportive facts:
5
The defendant was reluctant to marry being concerned regarding her
financial status.
The evidence is clear and the Court finds that when confronted with
the defendant's reluctance to remarry for the reasons stated above, that plaintiff
promised the defendant that she would not need to worry financially, that he
would take care of her in a financial setting. This promise was made under
circumstances where she had shared with him her financial information and
provided him with her tax returns going back several years. In support of and to
encourage the defendant to marry the plaintiff, the plaintiff revealed to the
defendant his substantial financial holdings. Both parties testified that just prior
to the marriage they discussed and agreed to put all of their property into a trust
for their mutual benefit so that what was his was hers and what was hers was his.
On continued pressure to enter into a marriage relationship, the defendant
ultimately was satisfied based upon the plaintiff's representations that marriage at
her stage in life under the circumstances then existing would not effect her
financial stability even though she would lose her permanent alimony. Based on
the foregoing, she agreed to marry the plaintiff.
(R.O.A. 136-138)
9. . . . The defendant further asserts in the alternative that should the
property of the plaintiff be determined by this Court to be premarital and not
subject to division, that she is entitled to substantial alimony based upon the
promises and representations of the plaintiff in view of what she gave up in the
form of permanent alimony by agreeing to marry the plaintiff,....
(R.O.A. 139-140)
37.
While the Court has determined that the plaintiffs promises to the
defendant are not sufficient to allow her to assert a legal claim against the
plaintiffs premarital properties, the Court is satisfied that the plaintiffs promises
which induced the defendant to give up financial security are enforceable. The
plaintiff made promises of financial security to the defendant to induce her to
enter into the marriage relationship. The Court is satisfied that she would not
have entered into the marital relationship except for the promises of the plaintiff
that she would be reasonably financially secure should she agree to give up her
sources of income in the form of permanent alimony from a prior spouse and
enter into the marital relationship with the plaintiff. The plaintiff made a promise
which he acknowledges. The promise is significant as far as the defendant was
concerned, and the plaintiff ought to be held to his promise in all good conscience
and in equity. * * * This Court, therefore, determines that defendant is entitled to
permanent alimony from plaintiff even though the marriage was of short duration.
The defendant...of course gave up her permanent alimony income from her
9

former husband. (R.O.A. 147)
Based on the foregoing findings being a major premise for its alimony award, the Trial
Court concluded:
3.
Defendant is awarded alimony from plaintiff in the sum of $1,000
a month until such time as defendant should remarry, cohabit, or the death of
either party.
(Conclusions of Law, R.O.A. 154)
As noted in Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App.
1994):
While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce appeals are reviewed
under the "clearly erroneous standard," its conclusions of law "are reviewed for
correctness and given no special deference on appeal." (citations omitted)
(Emphasis added)
As discussed in Sections I (B) and (D) of Mr. Kirk's previous Brief, the Trial Court's
conclusion on alimony is fatally defective under the legal correctness standard. Ms. Kirk is not
entitled to alimony from Mr. Kirk based on her loss of prior alimony. Neither is Ms. Kirk
entitled to alimony based on Mr. Kirk's purported promise he would take care of her financially.
Enforcement of such a promise, even if made, is contrary to the Statute of Frauds. Further, the
Trial Court erred in concluding the shortness of the marriage was irrelevant because of Ms.
Kirk's alimony loss and Mr. Kirk's purported promise.
Ms. Kirk's summary of the findings ignores the legal incorrectness of the $1,000 per
month conclusion, such conclusion being contrary to established law. Mr. Kirk did not attempt
in Point I of his prior Brief to simply reargue his case as contended by Ms. Kirk. Mr. Kirk
showed there and also here, that the Trial Court's conclusion on alimony is, in part legally
incorrect, and its findings in part, are clearly erroneous.
Ms. Kirk relies on Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992) to support that Judge
Hanson adhered to the required standards in determining alimony. As quoted by Ms. Kirk,
Watson provides:
If these three factors have been considered, we will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest
a clear abuse of discretion. (Emphasis added)
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Mr. Kirk has demonstrated such an abuse of discretion, both as to legal incorrectness and
as to factual erroneousness. Ms. Kirk states that, "even if the loss of Mrs. Kirk's prior alimony
award as that related to Mr. Kirk's active courting and promises of future financial security were
disregarded entirely, the [three] requirements of Schindler have still been satisfied in all respects."
As shown above, given Ms. Kirk's own testimony, showing with credible certainty there is a
$1,200 per month difference between her expense and income claims, the findings are clearly
erroneous.
Ms. Kirk states the Statute of Frauds does not apply for two reasons: First, the equitable
powers of the Court entitle it to override the statute and second, the Trust document executed by
the parties after their marriage satisfies the statute. Neither reason is valid.
Reply to First Reason
The judiciary is not entitled in seeking equity to override that which Utah's legislature
has statutorily prohibited and declared void. Utah code Section 25-5-4, Certain agreements void
unless written and signed, provides in part:
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some not or
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged
with the agreement:
(3)
every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon
consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry;
Ms. Kirk cites Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974) in support of judicial equity
overriding statutory mandate. Iverson notes the following at 1127:
Notwithstanding the equitable powers of the district court in interfamily
controversies in divorce matters, and the acknowledged broad latitude of discretion
allowed therein, the court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition or conjecture....
Ms. Kirk asks this Court to confirm the Trial Court's arbitrary supposition that its equity
power entitles it to override legislative dicta. Iverson nowhere supports this argument.
Reply to Second Reason
As discussed further below concerning the Trust, the parties intended and the Trial Court
correctly found it to be an estate planning devise, not a post-nuptial agreement. Further, the
Statute requires the written agreement to be executed in advance of the marriage, not after.
Ms. Kirk next critiques Mr. Kirk's use of the phrase "combined standard of living". She
quotes from Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988) recommending equalization
of "post-divorce living standards" and "that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage". As
11

discussed in Mr. Kirk's prior Brief, equalization is only necessarily appropriate in long term
marriages. Further, the equalization concept assumes spouses mutually enjoy the benefit of their
combined income "during the marriage".
In this matter, the parties discussed this sharing concept prior to the marriage on the
pressure exerted by Ms. Kirk on Mr. Kirk. Nevertheless, they both strictly kept their income and
expenses separate during their brief relationship. The marital standard of living experienced by
the parties was the same as before the marriage - each continued to support themselves
separately. Post-divorce continuation of that standard requires Ms. Kirk to rely upon herself,
which she is easily able to do with the $1,200 additional per month. She can enjoy the same
standard of living she had before the marriage without any alimony from Mr. Kirk. She would
in no way need, nor be entitled to public assistance given her actual income and expenses.
Ms. Kirk argues that the Trial Court acknowledged the brevity of the marriage. That is
true. Nevertheless, the Trial court found the brevity to be irrelevant because of its replacement
and promise theories. Because those theories are legally incorrect, and where the Trial Court
premised its alimony conclusion on those theories, it was improper to give the brevity of the
marriage no weight whatsoever. The Trial Court erred in not giving the brevity factor the
substantial weight it deserves in this case.
For all the above reasons, the Trial Court abused its discretion in its alimony award. The
relief sought by Mr. Kirk concerning alimony should be granted.
REPLY TO POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF MS. KIRK'S ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION GIVEN
THE IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE SUPPLIED BY MS. KIRK
HERSELF SHOWING HER CLEAR ABILITY TO PAY SUCH.
In her Brief at pages 26-29, Ms. Kirk quotes at length her counsel's proffer and the Trial
Court's findings concerning attorney's fees. She then claims Mr. Kirk's argument "is flawed
because it simply ignores the evidence which was presented to the trial court and the findings
which flowed from that evidence".
Mr. Kirk did not ignore the evidence. He concretely pointed out that Ms. Kirk's claims
of need and lack of ability were mathematically impossible and therefore highly incredible given
the irrefutable evidence showing her having a $1,200 per month difference apart from her claims.
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Ms. Kirk made no response to the following:
1)

Why her near $8,000.00 in savings at trial time could not be used to satisfy the

$6,565 balance owed her counsel.
2)

Why, given her actual financial status including the certain $ 1,200 per month extra,

she could not continue paying $517 per month as she had prior to trial, and while paying said
sum satisfy the $6,565 balance in just one year.
3)

Why her $60,000.00 equity in her $80,000.00 condominium could not be used to

pay the balance owed to her counsel.
Ms. Kirk claims that where Mr. Kirk did "not cross examine" the proffer concerning fees
"it is unfair for Mr. Kirk to now claim that the proffer was deficient. On this basis alone his
appeal of his issue is without merit." Mr. Kirk was not required to cross examine the proffer.
The proffer alone, without more, is deficient on its face based on this Court's clear ruling in
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989). Ms Kirk made no response to Mr. Kirk's
discussion of Sorensen in his prior Brief.
Sorensen at 832 provides in part as follows:
...Mrs. Sorensen's attorney proffered an exhibit reflecting only the time
spent and the rates charged. Dr. Sorensen's counsel stipulated that the proffer
could be received but expressly refused to stipulate to the "reasonableness" of the
fees. * * * Accordingly, we find the proffered testimony insufficient to sustain the
award of attorney fees, and therefore, we reverse. (Italics in original)
Mr. Kirk's counsel's mere proffer is thus deficient to address the following three factors
covered in Mr. Kirk's prior Brief:
1)

The difficulty of the litigation.

2)

The necessity and reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case.

3)

The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services.

As to the fourth factor on reasonableness - the result obtained - Ms. Kirk states: "No
evidence was presented on this issue because a result had not yet been obtained." Nevertheless,
when the Trial Court made its ruling on attorney fees, it was certainly aware of the result it had
decreed.
Mr. Kirk "submitted that this factor in connection with an award of attorneys fees in a
divorce action is inappropriate for two reasons." She then states: "First, since attorney fee
evidence in divorce cases is presented prior to any final decision in a divorce case, it is
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impossible to give any meaningful testimony in this regard." Nevertheless, divorce cases are not
any different in this regard than other civil cases. Thus, Ms. Kirk's first reason is fallacious.
Ms. Kirk's second reason is that "such a consideration is inappropriate in that it at least
suggests that a type of contingent fee arrangement is acceptable in divorce cases". Ms. Kirk here
confuses the difference between who should be responsible for payment of attorney fees incurred
regardless of the "result obtained" and attorneys fees only due upon a contingent result. Ms.
Kirk's argument flies in the face of her own argument under Point VI of her Brief requesting
attorney's fees on appeal if she were to prevail. There she argues that she should be entitled to
such fees because of the result she hopes to obtain on appeal. Such a request on appeal is no
different than the principle of attorney's fees being awarded based on the result obtained by Mr.
Kirk on the trial level.
As noted in Mr. Kirk's prior Brief, approximately 80% of the fees incurred by both
parties were consumed in addressing the property division issue, upon which issue Mr. Kirk
prevailed. Where Mr. Kirk was clearly reasonable in his contention during the proceedings
below on the property division issue. Ms. Kirk was wrong during the proceedings below in
arguing her meritless claim for one-half of Mr. Kirk's pre-marital property as she is wrong in
pursuing said issue on appeal. Ms. Kirk should be responsible for her own attorney's fees where
they were incurred pursuing this unmerited claim against Mr. Kirk's pre-marital property.
The evidence clearly shows Ms. Kirk's ability to have paid the balance of her attorney's
fees owed at the time of trial. Given her $60,000.00 condominium equity, her having averaged
$517.00 per month toward such fees during the below proceedings along with her increase in
savings, and her actual ability to have met all her purported expenses, there is no reason she
should not be responsible for the balance of her fees owed at trial time.
RESPONSE TO POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN TREATING THE KIRK
FAMILY TRUST AS AN ESTATE PLANNING DEVICE AND IN AWARDING
EACH PARTY THEIR SEPARATE PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY.
The pre-marital property of both parties should be viewed as the parties' separate property
and each party should retain the separate property they brought into the marriage. The evidence
was more than sufficient to support the Trial Court's determination of the Kirk Family Trust
being an estate planning device and not a post-nuptial agreement.
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Both parties' testimony demonstrates their intent was to create a tool for estate type
advantages and not to serve as a nuptial agreement to be employed by Ms. Kirk to her advantage
in the event of a divorce. At several places in the record the parties' testimony shows their estate
planning intent.
Ms. Kirk acknowledged both the revocability provision in the Trust and that the Attorney
who prepared the Trust never indicated it to be any kind of nuptial agreement:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

The execution of the trust was that this was done on June 13th,
1991, this was done in Lorin Martin's office; is that correct?
Yes.
Was that trust agreement read to you?
Yes. We read it.
You read it. And do you recall if that trust was revokable?
Yes.
Did he indicate explicitly through that trust agreement, paragraph
four indicates that either yourself or Mr. Kirk could withdraw any
of the property that you or Mr. Kirk put into that trust without the
consent of the trustee, or without the consent of the other party?
He said we both could....

Q.

Did Mr. Lorin Martin ever indicate that this was to be a prenuptial, or nuptial kind of agreement?
A.
No.
(TV2:183 LI to 184 L4)
Mr. Kirk was asked about discussions the parties had with Tom Monson, an attorney with
whom the parties consulted regarding creating the Trust prior to Lorin Martin. Mr. Kirk was
asked if there were "[a]ny discussions about alimony, or payment to her if [a] divorce was
obtained?" Mr. Kirk replied, "No." (TV2:36 LI8-20)
Mr. Kirk also testified that Ms. Kirk refused to allow an attorney available to them
without charge draft the trust and she insisted the parties use an attorney of her choice instead.
(TV 1:31 L12-24)
Mr. Kirk was asked about discussions the parties had together with Lorin Martin. He was
asked whether "this trust agreement was an estate plan, or marital plan, or what kind of a plan - what was your understanding?" He responded that "as far as I knew, it was just a trust."
(TV1:32 L18-21, 33 Ll-2) Mr. Kirk further explained the parties' discussions with Lorin Martin
focused around the estate planning provisions:
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Q.

Was there anything said that the trust governs the distribution of
your property in theevent of your death?
A.
Oh, yes.
Q.
And it would govern the distribution of property in the event of Peggie's death.
A.
Yes.
Q.
This was discussed?
A.
As far as I know, it was.
Q.
What ~ was there also a discussion as to what would happen if
both of your passed away?
A.
Yes. I think there was.
(TV 1:33 L4-15)
Mr. Kirk further testified that the purpose for which the parties created the Trust was to
address income tax and probate type of concerns:
Q.
A.

Do you recall any provisions of the document itself?
Well, in a vague way. I don't see how anybody could memorize
a whole thing like that I knew it was a trust. I agreed to the
circumstances of the trust. In general, the trust was to take care of
tax possibilities when we died. We all understood that it can save
some income taxes, and probates, and so forth. And we delineated
who was going to handle the trust in case we were — died, or
incapacitated.
(TV2:34 L-21 to 35 L5)
Mr. Kirk also testified like Ms. Kirk regarding the Trust's revocability clause:
Q.

Now, in relationship to the trust, do you recall whether or not there
was any provision for making the trust revokable?
A.
Yes. I know it was a revokable trust.
(TV 1:35 L18-21)
Q.

Was there discussions between Mr. Martin, yourself, and in the
presence of Peggie that it was a revokable trust?
A.
Yes. That was the kind of trust that they were making.
(TV 1:36 Ll-5)
Q.
A.
Q.

Article four, page two. Do you have that?
Yes.
I'm going to ask you if this particular revocation and amendment
was read by Mr. Martin or yourself at the time it was signed?
A.
Well, they have a computer, this is a standard revocation thing as far as I know.
Q.
Do you understand my question? My question was specifically
article four, page two discussed by yourself, Peggie and Mr.
Martin?
A.
Yes.
(TV 1:37 L23 to 38 L9)
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As a general rule, pre-marital property is viewed by Utah appellate courts as separate
property and equity usually requires that "each party retain the separate property he or she
brought into the marriage." Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990), cited in
Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991). (See also, Painter v. Painter, 752 R2d 907
(Utah App. 1988) and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980).) Although this rule
is not invariable, the Trial Court considered all the pertinent circumstances. The following
factors were appropriately considered by the Trial Court:
The amount and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was acquired before
or during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the respective
financial conditions, needs and earning capacity; the duration of the marriage; there being no
children of the marriage; the parties' ages at the time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties
gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the property division has with the amount
of alimony to be awarded; and of particular concern - whether one spouse has made any
contribution toward the growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and whether the assets
were accumulated or enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties.
The evidence is totally devoid of any contribution by Ms. Kirk to Mr. Kirk's pre-marital
assets she seeks to obtain on appeal.
Haumont, supra, is particularly significant, where this Court reversed the Trial Court's
ruling which awarded the wife the Grand Canyon Motel and an $18,000.00 account, both of
which were the husband's separate property prior to the three and one-half year marriage.
In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982) the Court upheld the principle that each
party should receive the real and personal property they brought into the marriage or inherited
during the marriage where the parties had been married about seven years, both had been married
before and had children from prior marriages and both had brought substantial properties to the
present marriage. The Trial Cur appropriately refused to grant the husband any interest in the
wife's inherited property despite the husband's claim that he performed legal work on the
building lot and did some work on the farm. The Supreme Court found no error in the Trial
Court's refusal, stating the "Wife's inheritance was not acquired through the joint efforts of the
parties", citing Jesperson v. Jesperson, supra.
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Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) supports that pre-marital property, gifts and
inheritances are viewed as separate property and equity requires that each party retain the
separate property.
The parties' pre-marital assets did not lose their character by commingling, gift, or
transfer to the Kirk Family Trust. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)
provides much guidance applicable in this matter:
We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable" property division
pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most
other jurisdictions and with the division made in many of our own cases, generally
award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage
(or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any
appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his
or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v.
Dubois, supra, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an
interest therein to the other spouse. Cf. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326
(Utah 1980).
The parties' real and personal property was not commingled during the short one year
marriage. The parties' checking accounts merely put the other's name on their respective
separate account. Mr. Kirk's Valley Bank account put Ms. Kirk's name on it and Ms. Kirk place
Mr. Kirk's name on her checking account at First Interstate Bank. Each, after the marriage,
continued to make deposits of his or her separate income in the accounts and each managed and
controlled the expenditures therefrom. Each party continued to treat his or her checking account,
which each had prior to the marriage, the same way after the marriage.

There was no

commingling of his income with her's or vice versa. Each account was and remained identifiable
as belonging to Mr. Kirk or Ms. Kirk. Nor did the parties intend any gift to the other. The joint
account was established for the benefit of the Kirk Family Trust, not for either of the individual
parties.
The Kirk Family Trust was signed by the parties on June 13, 1992, twelve days after the
date of the marriage. The Trust document (P-l) created a separate legal entity known as the Kirk
Family Trust. This trust entity was separate from each of the parties who were designated as cotrustees during their joint lives. The trust was not a self-executing instrument, i.e. the trust was
to be a viable and meaningful estate tool that needed to be funded. The parties to the trust
needed to execute appropriate documents to transfer the prior ownership of individually owned
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real and personal property to the trust. In fact, property must be received by the Trustee to
become a part of the Trust.
The few properties actually transferred went to the parties as Trustees of the Kirk Family
Trust. Neither party held the property as individuals. Their interest was that of Trustees.
All the personal accounts listed in Schedule A of the Kirk Family Trust were not transferred to
the parties as trustees for the Trust The documents necessary to effect the actual transfers into
the Trust, although signed by the parties, were never delivered to the financial institutions holding
the funds and therefore, were never received by the Trustees. (P-17) The only accounts which
were transferred are as follows:
1.
2.

Valley Bank & Trust, #02-30-406-6-5
Franklin U. S. Government Security Funds

3.

First Interstate Bank checking account, #28-15407-7

Ms. Kirk asserts that the Kirk Family Trust is, in substance, a post-nuptial agreement.
Ms. Kirk's assertion ignores the fact that the Trust was an estate planning device and not
intended or construed as an instrument to divide the marital assets in the event of a divorce.
To the extent that Ms. Kirk's assertion relies on the purported notion of the Trust being
a post-nuptial agreement and requests distribution accordingly, the Trust should not be enforce
in the divorce proceeding because it would violate public policy. To give the Trust the legal
effect of the pre- or post-nuptial agreement in a divorce action would violate public policy in that
it would contravene the public policy favoring marriage and its continuation. In Nielson v.
Nielson, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App. 1989) this Court adopted the restatement view and held "that
a promise in a Pre-nuptial Agreement regarding the disposition of property, upon divorce, of
property brought to the marriage by the parties is unenforceable if it tends to unreasonably
encourage divorce or separation".
The Trust contains no language as to the disposition of property in the event of divorce.
Ms. Kirk, by assigning legal effect to the Trust as a post-nuptial agreement, reforms the explicit
language of the Trust, contrary to the parties' intent. Most important, her treating the Trust as
a post-nuptial agreement encourages the divorce and separation on her part who stands to gain
more from the divorce than she would ordinarily receive under the traditional rules governing the
distribution of pre-marital property and inherited assets. Nielson, supra, further adopted the rule
that a spouse's expectation of receiving a large amount of money upon a divorce would violate
public policy favoring marriage and home.
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Matthews v. Matthews, 162 S.E.2d 697 (1968) cited in Nielson, supra, at page 1271,
refused to enforce a husband's ante-nuptial promise to let his wife have all of his property,
separate and marital, if he ever left her. Such a promise violates public policy favoring marriage
and home because the Court concluded "it would induce the wife to goad the husband into
separating from her".
Further, the exclusion from division of pre-marital and inherited property is justified upon
the grounds that property which comes to either party by avenues other than as a consequence
of their marital efforts owes nothing to the marriage and is not intended to be shared. Mortenson
v. Mortenson, supra.
The Court should note that Article IV of the Trust grants either party the right and power
to alter, amend or revoke the Trust Agreement with respect to that separate property which each
has contributed or to remove from the Trust that property which such persons contributed without
the consent of the Trustee by giving written notice to the Trustee to that effect. Under IRS Code
Section 676 (1986 Code) the grantor is treated as the owner of the trust where, at any time, the
power to reinvest title is exercisable by the grantor. Also see Section 2038 (1986 Code) relative
to estate tax. But for the Restraining Order enforced upon Mr. Kirk early in the proceedings, Mr.
Kirk would have exercised his rights to revoke the Trust and remove his pre-marital property
therefrom.
Both parties testimony demonstrate their intent of the Trust was to function as an estate
planning tool. Neither party testified of any intent that it function as a post-nuptial agreement
to be relied on in the event of a divorce. Both parties acknowledged the express revocable nature
of the Trust. Given this evidence and based on the precedents discussed above, the Trial Court
was certainly correct in finding the Trust to be an estate planning device and not some type of
nuptial agreement to control in the event of a divorce.
RESPONSE TO POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN NOT ORDERING MR. KIRK TO
REIMBURSE MS. KIRK FOR THE ATTORNEY'S FEES SHE ACTUALLY PAID
Ms. Kirk's argument under this point gives the impression she had no means to pay any
part of the $11,299.97 in attorney's fees and costs she incurred. She further asserts her purported
inability to pay anything was undisputed.
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Contrary to this assertion, Ms. Kirk's exhibit D-34, Attorney Fees and Costs Recap, shows
she made several payments from June of 1992 through February of 1993. Those payments total
$4,664.92. Ms. Kirk had already paid that sum to her counsel prior to trial. She obviously had
the ability to pay that amount. She borrowed no money to make the payments. As noted
previously, her savings increased by $2,588.51. Based on that evidence, it would be totally
unreasonable to now require Mr. Kirk to reimburse her for the $4,664.92 she has already paid.
The trial court committed no error by excluding the sum Ms. Kirk had already paid from the
award of attorney fees and costs.
RESPONSE TO POINT VI
MR. KIRK IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS HE HAS INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THIS REPLY/RESPONSE
The foregoing sections written in REPLY to Points I, II, and III clearly show that Mr.
Kirk's appeal on the issues of alimony and attorney fees has substantial merit. Mr. Kirk has
shown a significant abuse of discretion where the findings are clearly erroneous under Ms. Kirk's
own irrefutable testimony. Mr. Kirk has also shown the error in law made by the Trial Court
in basing alimony for the most part on the invalid replacement and promise theories.
Point IV of Ms. Kirk's Brief related to her cross appeal is incorrect. As discussed in Mr.
Kirk's prior Brief, approximately 80% of her attorneys fees and costs were consumed in
advancing her property division claims. The Trial Court appropriately restored the parties' premarital property as it was held by each of them prior to the marriage.
In this case Mr. Kirk is entitled to prevail on appeal and as such is entitled to an award
of attorneys fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
Based on all the foregoing reasons, the relief sought by Mr. Kirk's appeal of the alimony,
attorneys fees, and costs issues should be granted. The relief sought by Ms. Kirk's cross appeal
on the property division and attorneyJees and costs issues should be denied.
Respectfully submitted this

hmi Mitsunaga
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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